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“I told you a fairy tale, and you call
it falsehood?” Some concluding
remarks
« Je vous ai raconté un conte de fée, et vous appelez cela mensonge ? » Quelques
remarques finales
Roberte Hamayon
I am grateful to Laurent Legrain for inviting me to take part in the conference on “lying” he
organized in November 2014. The concluding remarks I made then are the basis of the present
article. I thank Thomas Michael for polishing the English of a draft version of this paper.
1 Is that a lie or not a lie? Answering such a question rests on a more or less subjective
evaluation of many such messages. Common sense would give roughly the same type of
recommendation as pragmatism theories1:  the most important thing in interpreting a
message  is  to  identify  its  relevant  context  or  the  interaction  in  which  it  is  spoken.
Engaging these sorts of articulation, we should make the context of what we are saying
clear to our listener and as a rule, we expect others to do the same. Collective expectation
is essential both in direct communication as well as in social life more broadly. This is
what is evident in the following sentence reported and commented on by the German
philosopher J. G. von Herder (1744-1803)2: “You uncivil thing! I told you a fairy tale, and
you call it falsehood?”
2 These are the words of an Amerindian in response to an inquisitive missionary, just after
telling him a story, which the missionary immediately marked out as “false”. The story
belongs to the Amerindian’s own oral tradition – a realm to be appreciated as such and to
which  reference  to  whatever  “truth”  is  irrelevant –,  whereas  the  missionary’s
condemnation rests on the Christian dogma. Not only are these two entirely distinct
ideological frames of reference which can only entail distinct expectations, but they also
differ in the following feature: the Christian dogma is a frame within which everything is
defined by reference to an “absolute truth”, and therefore all  that is contrary to the
dogma is declared a lie and morally condemned.
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3 Such distinctions can be found in many languages and cultures. On the one hand, there
may be frames of reference based on a specific rationality or logic where an absolute
understanding of truth and falsity is immediately and spontaneously recognized, and this
holds for religion3, law4, and even science5; such is the case in Mongolia where the couple
lie/truth (hudal/ünen)  are other frames of  reference that  depend on various kinds of
subjective rationality, in which any evaluation can only be relative to the context so that
“lying” is not morally condemned6.
4 More precisely,  notions of falsehood and truth seem not to be appropriate when the
relevant context is essentially subjective, as articulations both relational and emotional
are. We do not say that someone “lies” when he or she is conforming to the codes of
politeness appropriate to the circle in which he or she happens to be. Benjamin Constant
argued in his time that applying the principle that lying is morally reprehensible “would,
if  taken unconditionally and singly,  make any society impossible” (Constant,  cited by
Varden 2010); and C.-A. Sainte-Beuve seems to have confirmed this when he wrote half a
century later:  “if  one spoke one’s  mind for just  one minute,  society would crumble”
(Sainte-Beuve 1867).  What makes “social  dissimulation” possible7,  as Rodney Needham
remarked more recently, is the impossibility of really knowing someone else’s inner state
(Needham 1972, p. 101). Somewhat earlier, Marcel Mauss had highlighted the existence of
“social pressure” on the “expression of feelings” (Mauss 1921) and acknowledged that
simulation or dissimulation are often compulsory in order to create and reproduce social
bonds in events and situations where one cannot be sincere but should conform to social
expectations8.  Then,  if  the  emotions  expressed  are  somewhat  ambiguous,  they  can,
nevertheless, contain a modicum of sincerity. 
5 Thus,  social  dissimulation  implies  more  than  the  use  of  verbal  language  alone,  in
particular bodily and other forms of non-verbalized language; it can also include secrecy
or disinformation within the context of the overall situation. Besides, whether or not a
person is telling the truth or lying, s/he desires to have the listener believe that s/he is
telling the truth, unless of course the attempt to talk altogether fails. On the other hand,
a person who lies should at the same time give his or her interlocutors the necessary
signs to interpret what they are saying. For instance, in some contexts the liar’s attitude
or face should indicate that what they said is not a lie but a joke, in other words not to be
taken seriously. Thus, in Mongol, at the end of a sentence, one may say “I was lying” (
hudlaa)  to  indicate:  “I  was  joking”.  But  a  subtle  use  of  language  can  also  make  the
evaluation of a message change, for language is much more than a tool of communication:
it is a tool for mental operations in general:
In this view, the role of language as a communication system between individuals
would have come about only secondarily  […] Its  primary function would rather
have been the representation of a finer and richer reality, a way of handling more
efficiently a greater amount of information […] a way of symbolizing and coding
[cognitive images] (Jacob [1982] 1994, p. 58).
6 In  the  Mongol  tale  of  the  “wise  bride”  (tsetse ber),  the  young  woman  speaks  not  to
communicate but to demonstrate to her father-in-law how clever and wise she is by, for
example, finding a way of getting out of absolute situations (coming neither by night nor
by day, staying neither outdoors nor indoors, etc.) and by playing with words (coming at
dawn, between the wall and the inner covering, etc.) (Hamayon & Bassanoff 1973). 
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7 This  provides  us  with one more reason to assert  that  “lies”  can only be explored if
integrated within the understanding of communication or interaction, whether verbal or
non-verbal. 
 
Terms for lying are ambiguous in many languages
8 Now, not only is the evaluation of a message as “a lie” dependent upon the context, but
the words for “a lie” are often themselves not exempt from ambiguity, as the examples of
English “lie” and French “mensonge” show. 
In English, “to lie [down]” and “to lie (to tell lies)” are presented under one and the
same entry in dictionaries, which would nudge us to question the existence of an
underlying semantic relation between these two meanings. 
As to French mensonge, it comes from Latin mentio (mentire). The latter verb means
on the one hand “to mention” and on the other hand “to lie” – as if the very fact of
mentioning something could contain an untruth.
Likewise, English “falsehood” and French faux come from Latin fas “expression of
divine will”; this is the root from which both fabula, “fable” and fallacia, “deception,
delusion” come. Another Latin word for lying is mendacium,  derived from menda,
“spot or stain on the body, a physical defect”.
9 Likewise, the Mongol term hudal deserves examination. It is comparable to our notion of
lying in contexts where it can be opposed to “truth” (ünen), but this is far from being
applicable to all types of contexts. Thus, hudal is not opposed to “truth” but to “correct”,
“right”  (zöv),  in  contexts  in  which efficacy  is  relevant9.  One of  the  translations  that
Kowalewski’s dictionary gives for hudal is “inefficacious” (Kowalewski 1844-1849). In such
contexts,  hudal is  to  be  understood  as  “it  does  not  work”  and  would  connect  with
wrongness or falseness, by contrast with zöv “right, correct, exact”, which is understood
as “it works”, and would then connect with truth.
10 The noun hudal and the verb hudlah “to lie” are commonly acknowledged to be derived
from hud, “marriage alliance partner”, and hudaldaa “trade”, from hudlah. Alan Wheeler
examines this widely agreed upon etymology in a paper devoted to the Mongol notion of
market expressed by the term zah zeel10 (Wheeler 2004). He highlights the connotations of
deception, cheating, and lying attached to the term hudaldaa and to the type of trading it
denotes. And he rightly points to the kinship relation called hud, from which these terms
are derived, in order to account for these depreciative connotations.
Whilst the link between alliance (hud) and trade (hudaldaa) is so often obscured by
the perception  of  deceit  (hudal)  and  trickery  that  is  associated  with  Chinese
merchants, it is arguable that this “trickery” also has roots in Mongolian marriage
practices of the past (Wheeler 2004, p. 220).
11 However, Wheeler adds, certain researchers from Inner Mongolia now call this link into
question, and maintain that hudaldaa is derived from hud and not from hudal. As evidence
for this, he refers to the book Social Organization of the Turco-Mongol Pastoral Nomads by
Lawrence Krader (Krader 1963,  p. 36):  “although the ‘gift’  for  a  bride may have been
‘fixed’, its amount was often treated ‘as though it were a price for a piece of goods, in
which much haggling and bargaining would be done to raise or lower it  to the level
desired by one side or the other’” (Wheeler 2004, p. 220)11.
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About the link of lying to trading with in-laws
12 The use of the term hud, “in-laws”, is characteristic of the form of marriage exchange
called “generalised exchange” in kinship studies. Ethnographic data shows that this form
itself is tainted with a touch of deceit. Can we unravel why? Generalised exchange clearly
appears  potentially  deceitful  when  compared  with  the  symmetric  prescriptive  form
called “restricted” or “direct”. Typical of the latter is marriage by “sister exchange” or
“daughter exchange”, in which reciprocity is carried out within the same or the next
generation respectively. Such immediate or direct forms of reciprocity create confidence
and security, with every group being wife-giver and wife-taker with regard to one and the
same partner: both are called by the same name in Buryat, anda (Mongol and)12.
13 By contrast, generalised exchange dissociates wife giving and wife taking (a man of clan A
takes a wife from clan B and gives the daughter he has with her to clan C, i.e. a wife-taker
clan gives its daughters not to the wife giver’s but to another clan). This dissociation
creates uncertainty about the return of a woman to the wife-giver, hence their anxiety
and suspicion, and hence also the attention paid to discussions about the “bride price”
that is aimed at giving the wife-giver something to compensate for the loss of a daughter
13. And this can only generate a hierarchy between the two partners, which explains why,
contrary to and (see just above and note 12), hud is not a reciprocal term: it is used for the
groom’s father; the bride’s father being hudgui in Mongol, hudgoi in Buryat. On the other
hand, the delay in return exchange is also what creates the temporal interval within
which negotiations can be carried out; the latter are conventional but private and may
imply some lying as one among many forms of cunning that negotiations can entail.
Negotiations are initiated by the groom’s father, i.e. the wife taker, who is in an inferior
position as a “requestor” at the start (as is well known, the weaker can only use ruse if he
is to have a chance of winning!). He usually sends a relative to call on the girl’s father as a
go-between in charge of discussing the “bride price”.
14 However, the use of the verbal suffix of reciprocity, -ld, in the noun “trade” (hudaldaa),
and the verb “to trade” (hudaldah), annihilates the hierarchical connotation found in the
kinship relation; one should add “give” or “take” to distinguish “selling” (hudaldazh ögöh)
from “buying” (hudaldazh avah). It is worth noting that, in former times (still in the late
1970s), discussions about the price of objects sold at the flea market zah zeel were carried
out through the two partners’ mutual finger pressures on each other’s arms within their
sleeves; their negotiations thus being kept secret.
 
About the link between lying and trading
15 As Adam Smith and other scholars have shown, a similar link between lying and trading is
found in many other languages and cultures, and deception remains inherently tied to
exchange. For Smith, exchanging is necessarily delusive. Only the self-illusion that things
could be better  incites  people  to  take part  in producing wealth and participating in
exchange,  which allows the object  of  exchange to increase in value.  Smith implicitly
acknowledges the vital  part  that deception plays in the functioning of  any exchange
system when he writes: “It is deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the
industry of mankind14”.
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16 This question  was  the  topic  of  a  conference  that  brought  together  economists  and
anthropologists in Vienna in 1996. Caroline Gerschlager initiated the conference to call
into question mainstream economic theory. According to this theory, exchange does not
take place unless both parties mutually gain from it, and therefore deception is regarded
as  something  irrational  that  violates  the  rule  of  the  market  where  exchange  and
deception seem to be mutually exclusive.  To challenge this view,  Gerschlager invited
several anthropologists to explore the role that deception plays in exchange from an
anthropological  point  of  view:  deception  appeared  to  operate  as  a  tool  to  negotiate
interactions  and  to  help  exchange  relations  to  function  as  social  phenomena
(Gerschlager [ed.] 2001).
17 Gerschlager has all the more thoroughly examined Smith’s theory since she, as a native
speaker of German, had a beautiful example of such a link in her mother tongue; this
example is provided by the couple tauschen/täuschen, “to exchange”/”to deceive” – both
of  which  are  placed  under  the  same  entry in  dictionaries15.  The  French  expression
“donner le change”, literally “to give change”, actually means “to pull the wool over
somebody’s eyes”; such expressions can help to explain the semantic link between the
two notions (tauschen/täuschen)16. Gerschlager quotes following saying from Grimm to this
effect (Gerschlager 2001, p. 8, 22 n. 16): “He who has the desire to exchange has the desire
to deceive17”.
18 I would like to stress here that this apparent ambivalence does not mean polysemy: the
two meanings are tightly tied to one another, as they are in many other cultures and
languages18.  This  is  usually  accounted for  by  the  idea  that  maintaining relationships
matters  more  than  what  is  exchanged  or  communicated.  Mauss  develops  a  similar
argument in The Gift: gifts are meant to appear voluntary and disinterested, but in fact
they are obligatory and based on self-interest, and in all contracts each partner tries to
gain more by giving less: exchanges and negotiations rest on persuasion, seduction, and
possibly a touch of cheating. Several papers in Gerschlager’s edited book illustrate the
wide  range  of  behaviours  that,  far  from  blocking  transactions,  contribute  to  make
exchanges and negotiations function.
19 This is particularly evident in ritual practices aimed at requesting spiritual protection,
aid, or blessings from immaterial beings treated as exchange partners. Such practices rely
on the principle of substitution, whether they are called offerings, ransoms, sacrifices or
something else. The most famous case of such ritual substitutions is seen in the Nuer
sacrifice of a wild cucumber in place of an ox described by E. E. Evans-Pritchard in his
Nuer  Religion (Evans-Pritchard 1956).  There,  practices  resting  on  substitution  imply  a
particular conception of the offerings’ spiritual receivers: are the latter gods or spirits
conceived of as particularly tolerant or as unaware of being deceived? My own research
on certain types of shamanic rituals and on the use of euphemisms in Mongol and Buryat
“traditional” cultures has shown that the spirits of dead people are conceived of as liable
to be duped (Hamayon 2016, pp.  242-244)19.
Trickery and ruse seem to work particularly well  as long as they are applied in
relation with imaginary partners. The obvious coupling of exchange with deception
in ritual  exchanges  […]  does  not  constitute  a  threat  to  the repetitive  nature of
exchange. (Gerschlager 2001, p. 17).
20 While deceit by trickery, cheating or lying should in principle put the perpetuation of
exchange in danger, it is remarkable that it does not. Commenting on the fool’s role in
Magar rituals (Nepal),  Anne de Sales argues that seduction is the pleasant version of
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deception (or deception the dark side of seduction): he who makes the other laugh makes
them lose control of themselves, thereby providing an opportunity to obtain something
from them against their will by transforming their loss into a kind of satisfaction, so that
even the loser is happy. Here lies the exchange’s real dynamic and it is embodied by the
fool (Sales 2001, pp. 122-123). Remarkable also are deceptive operations in which no one
feels deceived (Lépinay & Hertz 2005), ceremonial gifts for example, since these are not
about goods but about social recognition (Hénaff 2005).
21 The interdependence of exchanging and deceiving finds a clear illustration in the dual
figure of Hermes in ancient Greek mythology: both merchants and thieves claim him as
their god. He steals a herd of cows belonging to his elder brother Apollo by making them
walk backwards so that their tracks lead Apollo in the wrong direction. Apollo’s first
reaction is to send hounds to track the thief, but he soon is charmed by the music Hermes
plays. Hermes finally becomes the protector of herdsmen and thieves, merchants and
conjurers, roads, boundaries and travellers. His art is above all that of metis, cunning and
elusiveness (Detienne & Vernant [1974] 1991, pp. 10, 49, 287-288). Odysseus, too, is a liar
and a thief. On top of being one of the strongest among the Achaeans, and probably the
best archer,  his main attribute and nickname is polymetis,  “[man] of many tricks”.  In
Homer’s  Iliad,  he wins the war against  the Trojans by tricking them into bringing a
“horse” full  of his soldiers into their city.  Examining other Greek mythical examples,
Martin  Treml  highlights  the  role that  ruse  and cunning play  in  the  development  of
exchange; he shows that, in Euripides’ tragedies, men confronted with the constraints
that any law of exchange represents resort to ruse and cunning in order to maintain an
advantage over their partners (Treml 2001, pp. 149-163).
22 Ruse  and  cunning  are  inherent  in  any  practice  that  involves  bargaining.  Avoiding
haggling in a situation where it is usually expected may even arouse suspicion, as in The
Life of Brian (by the Monty Python crew 1979): while running away from his pursuers, the
hero  crosses  the  market  place where,  at  a  stall,  he  immediately  proffers  the  price
demanded of him, and his lack of hesitation provokes a protest from the vendor20.  In
Romania, gypsy horse-dealers create the trading situation by gestures and jokes; haggling
means for them opposing the dominant ethics, that of work (Steward 1994, p. 113).
 
Misunderstanding massive nouns for lies
23 In  the  above-mentioned  cases,  ruse,  cunning  and  cheating  do  not  hinder  exchange;
neither does substitution of small for big diminish the “efficacy” of ritual offerings aimed
at  obtaining aid from spiritual  beings.  If  we examine these cases  more carefully,  we
observe  that  the  spiritual  beings  concerned  are  all  of  human  origin  or  humanized.
According to data from Siberian societies subsisting on hunting, substitution would be
absolutely inconceivable with respect to the spirits of wild animal species hunted for
food. The latter societies perform long collective shamanic periodical rituals to obtain
“luck”, i.e. promises of game from the spirits of wild species. Their shaman should get as
many promises of game or animal “vital force21” as possible during the major part of the
ritual, and promise the spirits as little human “vital force” as possible in return at the end
of the same ritual. In their view, this is not being disloyal; on the contrary, this is proving
skill  in the exchange of vital force with animal spirits,  thought to be fair play. What
matters is that the shaman respects the nature of what is exchanged (“human life force”
in exchange of “animal life force”); lessening the amount is perceived as a loyal ruse on
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his part; this is the kind of cleverness that is most expected from the shaman. Whatever
their  amount,  the  spoils  of  the  hunt  will  be  shared  between  the  members  of  his
community following rules that may vary from one community to another and concern
the parts of the pieces of game (i.e. head, legs, etc.) rather than their quantity. Sharing
guarantees both the survival and the morality of the community.
24 In many cultures, there are goods considered as not liable to be counted (measured or
weighed)  whether  they  are  destined  to  be  shared  or  not;  they  constitute  a  specific
morphological category, called “mass or uncountable nouns” (French: « noms massifs ou
indénombrables »). They are always singular and require singular verbs. This is the case
with game, and if we are to count, we say “pieces of game”. In English, sugar, tea, rice,
water,  and many goods,  including reindeer and cattle,  are uncountable.  Uncountable
goods also exist as a morphological category in Russian (game dich’, cattle skot, tea chai,
etc.).
25 While there are also uncountable goods in Mongol  and Buryat  cultures,  they do not
constitute a  properly morphological  category in their  languages22.  Nevertheless,  they
exist as a conceptual category, and this may account for the cases when people seem to
give untrue answers to questions about quantities.
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NOTES
1. C. S. Pierce, W. V. O. Quine, L. Wittgenstein, P. Grice, D. Wilson & D. Sperber and many others
(for an overview, see Origgi 2011). Paul Grice defines the cooperative principle that makes people
interact with one another as follows:  "I  expect a partner’s  contribution to be appropriate to
immediate needs at each stage of the transaction" (Grice 1975, p. 47). This is a way of explaining
the link between utterances and how they are understood. 
2. Herder’s conclusion was the following: “conceits of this sort are not philosophy, bur rather a
sensual illusion of sensual people”. And he continues: “[…] crises stimulated all early peoples to
consult soothsayers for assistance in making decisions” (quoted by Flaherty 1992, p. 146). In his
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Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Herder says calling the shaman a trickster or
deceiver is useless: what matters is his ability to reach people’s imagination (ibid., pp. 147-148).
To him, using cunning is better than using brute force.
3. In the Judaeo-Christian environment in which Western anthropology developed, lying cannot
be analysed separately from truth; however, the relationship between the two concepts has been
explored mainly from the standpoint of “truth”, which has been more thoroughly debated and
for a much longer time.
4. Lying  may be  punished  by  law in  the  USA.  Taking  an  oath  in  a  court  of  law is  a  sworn
declaration to tell the truth.
5. Even in science which could be considered as a sphere of objective rationality, only facts are
usually called “true” or “false”, not theories, which also depend partly on subjective rationality
or logics: scientists would refrain from claiming their theory is “true”; they would only say it can
be held to be valid as long as it has not been proved “false”.
6. In such case, an adjective would often be added, as for instance “white lie” in English, pieux
mensonge in French, to indicate that such a lie is not reprehensible.
7. The inability to hide, to dissemble, to deceive and to lie is currently said to be a sign of autism
in a child.
8. At the theatre, we expect that the actors express the character’s feelings, not their own, even
if we don’t go as far as Diderot did in the pamphlet The Paradox of Acting published after his death.
He argued that the best actors are all the more capable of moving the audience precisely because
they do not feel the emotion themselves: “If [an actor] is endowed with extreme sensitivity […]
he will either play no more or play ludicrously poorly” (Diderot [1830] 1883, p. 102).
9. Grégory Delaplace noticed this opposition during the conference in November 2014.
10. The term zah zeel designated the flea market held outdoors just on the boundary of the city
Ulaanbaatar on Sundays at the time of my fieldwork under the communist regime (from the late
1960s  until  the  late  1980s).  Thanks  to  Laurent  Legrain  for bringing  Wheeler’s  article  to  my
attention.
11. The next pages of the article are devoted to the way the Soviet regime provided legitimacy
for the state’s take-over of virtually all aspects of life, including commercial transactions. Follows
a discussion about another term for trade, naimaa (commerce, trade), borrowed from Chinese,
and about the notion of zah zeel from a standpoint of morality in economics.
12. “To exchange belts” (Buhe andaldaha) is still used to speak of marriage in Buryat. Mongol and
designates mainly the hunting partner (be it another hunter or a dog); it designates the partner
with whom one swears perfect friendship in The Secret History of the Mongols (Rachewiltz 2006) and
other historical sources.
13. Epics  and  ethnographic  data  show that  the  Buryats  living  at  the  West  of  Lake  Baikal
fluctuated between direct and generalised forms of exchange by the end of the XIXth century
(Hamayon 1990, pp. 344-364). We find an expression of their hesitation in the use of the paired
verbs  andaldaha  hudaldaha to  designate  the  marriage  agreement  concluded between the  epic
hero’s father and his bride’s father in their childhood. Both verbs are formed with the suffix -ld,
which indicates reciprocity.
14. Quoted by Caroline Gerschlager 2001, p. 27.
15. For another Indo-European root combining the notions of exchange and lie, see Benveniste
1966, pp. 99-100.
16. This also brings to mind the Latin expression dolus bonus (I thank P. Palussière for calling my
attention  to  it).  In  French  law,  it  is  understood  as  “the  merchant’s  sales  talk,  the  pedlar’s
exaggeration; it does not allow nullity; on the contrary, dolus malus is a serious lie allowing action
in nullity” (« le boniment du marchand, l’exagération du camelot ; il ne permet pas la nullité ; le
dolus malus a  contrario est un mensonge grave permettant l'action en nullité »).  In American
English,  the  M.  Webster  dictionary  defines  dolus  bonus as  “simple  cunning  or  sagacity  in
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bargaining  or  in  other  transactions  that  is  not  actionable  or  punishable  as  fraud  or
misrepresentation or ground for rescinding the transaction induced by it”.
17. “Wer  Lust  hat  zu  tauschen,  hat  Lust  zu  täuschen”  (Jacob  and  Wilhelm  Grimm,  cited  by
Gerschlager 2001).
18. Marcel Mauss points to a similar ambivalence with the term “gift”: “The danger represented
by the thing given or handed on is doubtless nowhere better sensed than in the very ancient
Germanic law and languages.  This explains the double meaning of the word Gift  in all  these
languages – on the one hand, a gift, on the other, poison” (Mauss [1923-1924] 1990, pp. 80-81). 
“Gift” is the translation of Latin dosis, “dose of poison” (ibid., p. 186, n. 122).
19. Practices based on the principle of substitution are widespread in those religious forms of the
type currently called paganism and polytheism. By contrast, Abrahamic monotheism introduces
the idea that God, the Almighty, sees and hears everything humans do, and is in principle not
liable to be deceived.  He is  Truth.  Hence,  lying is  reserved for humans.  Is  that  what incited
Montaigne to write the following: “If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth is as much to say,
as that he is brave towards God and a coward towards men?” (« Si on y fait bien attention, qu’est-
ce qu’un menteur, sinon un homme couard à l’endroit des hommes et brave à l’endroit de Dieu
? »).
20. The street vendor tells Brian: “No, no, no. Ten? You’re supposed to argue. Ten for that, you
must be mad!” 
21. Animal meat that feeds the human body is seen as carrying animal vital force that feeds the
human soul.  Rituals  performed on hunted animals  are  aimed at  reducing hunting to  merely
taking meat.
22. The  suffixes  held  to  make  the  words  plural  in  fact  designate  a  collection  of  concrete
individual members of the category. Here is a Mongol example, nom avsan: he bought book(s),
nomuud avsan: he bought several books.
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